Taxation—State Income Tax—Exemption for Nondomiciliaries by Kantor, Marvin
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 7 Number 1 Article 94 
10-1-1957 
Taxation—State Income Tax—Exemption for Nondomiciliaries 
Marvin Kantor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Taxation-State and Local Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Marvin Kantor, Taxation—State Income Tax—Exemption for Nondomiciliaries, 7 Buff. L. Rev. 171 (1957). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol7/iss1/94 
This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
Subsequent to the decision of this case, the legislature amended the section
herein discussed by extending the tax to any agreement "whereby a right to
acquire the premises through an option, a first privilege or a first refusal is
granted" in addition to the provisions previously in the statute.'3 Although this
appears to clearly indicate the intent of the legislature to reach interests such as
that of the petitioner in this case, it is not certain whether the dictum regarding
reasonableness of classification will allow a different holding in a future decision
under the amended statute.
State Income Tax-Exemption For Nondomiciliaries
In the case of First Trust & Deposit Company v. Goodrich14 appellant, as
guardian for two infants, contended that their income was within an exemption to
the New York state tax law which excludes from taxation the income of any
person who, though domiciled in the state, maintains no permanent place of
abode within the state, but does maintain a permanent place of abode without the
state.i The tax commission's sole contention was that the infants by a legal
fiction, that infants do not have the power to change their own domicile, could
not maintain an abode without the state and therefore failed to qualify under the
above exemption.
Under the facts, upon the parents' death the infants' nearest living relatives
were a paternal and maternal grandmother. The paternal grandmother petitioned
the court to appoint the plaintiff, a first cousin of the infants, guardian of the
infant. No one including the maternal grandmother objected and the court
accordingly appointed the plaintiff, guardian. The plaintiff was at that time and
has remained ever since a resident of California.
The Court of Appeals held that the Surrogate, under the circumstances, must
have intended to change the infants' domicile and that in addition this was done
on the recommendation of the infants' natural guardian (paternal grandmother).
There is no question but that a natural or a testamentary guardian may
change the domicile of his ward.' Regarding a court appointed guardian, the
better reasoned rule is that when such a guardian, in good faith, and for the
benefit of the ward, changes his own domicile from one state to another he
should also be deemed to have changed the domicile of his ward.' 7 In the instant
13. N.Y. TAX LAW §4(17), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 933, §1.
14. First Trust & Deposit Company v. Goodrich, 3 N.Y.2d 410, 165 N.Y.S.2d
510 (1957).
15. N.Y. TAx LAW §350(7).
16. Lamar v. Micou, 112 U.S. 452 (1884).
17. Matter of Kiernan, 38 Misc. 394, 77 N.Y. Supp. 924 (Surr. Ct. 1902);
Matter of Robitaille, 78 Misc. 108, 138 N. Y. Supp. 391 (Surr. Ct. 1912).
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case the change did not come about in this manner, but occurred because the
Surrogate sent the infants to a new domicile, thereby precluding the possibility
of manipulation by the guardian to suit his own, possibly fraudulent purposes. This
can only be construed as having been done in good faith and for the sole benefit
of the infants, which is the chief consideration in determining an infant's domicile.
City Sales Tax On Alcoholic Beverages
Hoffman v. City of Syracuse,'8 presented a problem' of interpretation,
involving an ambiguous regulation and conflicting directives issued by the city's
commissioner of finance. Pursuant to a state enabling act,19 the City of Syracuse
imposed a two per cent tax on alcoholic beverages sold at retail for off-premises
consumption. Simultaneously, with the adoption of an ambiguous regulation the
city's commissioner of finance issued a directive effective as of January 1, 1952,
which "authorized and directed" the liquor dealers of Syracuse to compute the sales
tax on alcoholic beverages on the basis of the full retail prices, but, less the federal
and state excise taxes included therein. This directive seemingly interpreted the
regulation as to the proper method of calculating the taxes. Plaintiffs complied
with this directive with the apparent approval of the local taxing authorities
until 1955, when the commissioner issued new directives which in essence
countermanded the 1952 directive and seemingly contradicted the regulation. The
new directive stated that effective as of October 1, 1955, the plaintiffs would be
required to include the federal and state excise taxes in the overall retail price
when computing the tax.
Plaintiffs did not controvert the courts unanimous finding that the latter
directives correctly interpreted the statute, but contended that since the regulation
was still in effect, the method of computing the taxes remained as before,
notwithstanding the 1955 directive. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' argument
by replying that since the 1955 directives were in conformity with the statute, the
plaintiffs were no longer justified in relying on either the "ambiguous regulation"
or the "explicit but erroneous" 1952 directive. "The tax is imposed, not by the
directive or, for that matter, by the regulation, but by the state and local
statutes."
20
This type of dispute points up the confusion that may result when an
administrative official in attempting to clarify the meaning of an ambiguous
regulation, issues a countermanding directive rather than an amendment to the
regulation itself.
18. 2 N.Y.2d 484, 161 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1957).
19. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1947, c. 278.
20. Hoffman v. Syracuse, note 18 supra at 492, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 117; See also,
Good Humor Corp. v. McGoldrick, 289 N.Y. 452, 46 N.E.2d 881 (1943).
